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TRAILS OF INCOMPLETE DECOLONISATION IN AFRICA: 
THE LAND QUESTION AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL 
TRANSFORMATION
Horman CHITONGE
Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town
ABSTRACT   Debates on decolonisation have featured prominently, particularly in South 
Africa, starting from 2014. Although the concept of decolonisation encompasses a wide 
range of ideas, there is a general sense that decolonisation is intended to draw attention to the 
fact that the dominant modes of thinking and production of knowledge across Africa are 
defined and dominated by a Western world view. In this debate, it is often argued that this 
represents the failure to fully decolonise the continent, even if colonial occupation ended 60 
years ago in most countries. In this article, I argue that decolonisation project in Africa has 
remained incomplete and there are different manifestations of this. Two examples from the 
land and the economy are used to illustrate the unfinished project of the decolonising Africa. 
By arguing that decolonisation has remained incomplete, the paper is not arguing that there 
has been no attempt to decolonise; but that these efforts have not been radical enough to see 
the project to its logical conclusion. This is partly because the project of decolonisation was 
narrowly framed within the nationalist project, which tended to equate decolonisation with 
political liberation. 
Key Words: Decolonisation; Africa; Colonialism; Coloniality; Power relations; Decentring.
INTRODUCTION
Land has always played a critical role in the transformation of African societies. 
Sam Moyo (2007), who dedicated much of his life to the study of issues around 
land in Africa,  argued that economic development for the continent will be 
difficult to achieve without resolving the land and agrarian question. In Sam 
Moyo’s scholarship, the land question was very central to the point that he saw 
the land and agrarian questions as constituting a national question, with direct 
connection to economic growth and development (see Moyo & Yeros, 2011). In 
all this, the current state of the land and agrarian questions (the national question) 
and economic structural transformation in all African countries remains a clear 
reminder of an incomplete decolonial project. The incompleteness of decolonisation 
is partly evident in the post-colonial African states’ failure to deconstruct the 
colonial social engineering and the subsequent power matrix (often referred to 
as the coloniality of power) which continues to shape the land and agrarian 
structure and as well as African economies.
Completing the decolonisation project, would require a critical engagement 
with the subtle trails of coloniality of power which continue to dictate not only 
the activities of most Africans, but also their modes of thought and being. Using 
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examples from the land and agrarian field, and also from the structure of African 
economies, this article illustrates that the decolonal project, embarked on in most 
African countries during the 1960s, has only partially dislodged the colonial 
rationality and hegemony. The importance of the land question and the structure 
of African economies in unsettling colonial hegemony and modes of thought 
cannot be over-emphasised. The decolonial discourse in this article applies to 
the entire continent for two specific reasons. First of all, the decolonial project 
was embarked on by all countries in Africa including countries which were not 
physically occupied by colonial powers; for example Ethiopia and Liberia. Second, 
the colonisation was not merely a physical process of occupying certain territories; 
it was much deeper than that, involving the reclassification of the human race 
into us and them, the civilised and uncivilised, the developed and the 
underdeveloped, the industrial and pre-capitalist, etc., (see Mamdani, 1996). It 
is indeed a dangerously superficial reading of colonialism to exclude Liberia 
and Ethiopia (and sometimes Morocco and Egypt) from the process of 
decolonisation simply because these countries were not ‘fully colonised!’ The 
colonial rationality and modes of thought applied to all countries in Africa, and 
as such, the process of decolonisation remains incomplete in all these countries. 
This paper has five sections. In the next section, I discuss the importance of 
the land question in the colonial and decolonial projects. This is followed by a 
discussion of the concept of decolonisation and what this means in the African 
context today. In section three a brief discussion of African post-colonial states 
and the status of the decolonial project is presented. The next section illustrates 
the incompleteness of the decolonial project drawing from the land and the 
economy. The last section sums up the discussion.
LAND IN THE COLONIAL AND DECOLONIAL PROJECTS
Form the earlier encounters with imperial and colonial forces in Africa, the 
control over land proved to be central to the colonial project. Colonialism became 
a viable project only after the imperial forces secured control of the land through 
various means including armed invasion, ruthless dispossession of indigenous 
communities, signing of dubious/fraudulent treaties with the African ruling elites, 
and the negotiation of loose mining concessions. The introduction of colonial 
rule in both settler and non-settlers colonies in Africa did not only lead to 
the introduction of a foreign system of land tenure, but it fundamentally 
altered the way Africans think and relate to land as illustrated below. Most 
of, if not all, the policy and administrative changes introduced through 
colonialism were tailored to protect and advance the interests of the minority 
European settlers, with little or no regard to the local African people who 
were, directly and indirectly, turned into tenants of the imperial Crowns, on 
their mother’s land (Okoth-Ogendo, 1989). Given the humiliation and violence 
to which Africans were subjected during colonialism, when most African countries 
became independent, there was great expectation that the nationalist leaders, who 
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fought for the land against foreign occupation, would not only reconstruct the 
agrarian structure, but also remove the distortions which colonialism introduced 
around land and the economy. Not surprising, the decolonisation project, which 
started with the liberation struggle, was rooted in the land question as far as 
the land defined the polity and the sovereignty of the nation-state which the 
nationalist aspired to (Mkandawire, 2011). But, almost six decades after most 
African states gained independence, the decolonisation of the land and agrarian 
structures, and the accompanying administrative systems remain an incomplete, if 
not, abandoned project. Just as the securing of control over land was central to 
the colonial project, the resolution of the land question in all its various dimensions 
across Africa remains key to a complete decolonial project.
In this paper, I illustrate the incompleteness of the nationalists’ decolonisation 
project using two examples; one from the land question and the other from the 
structure of African economies. Using these two examples, the paper illustrates 
the continuity of the colonialilty of power, which is a reflection of the failure 
on the part of post-colonial African states to decolonise the land and the economic. 
This is not to argue that there has been no attempt to decolonise; early African 
nationalists recognised the need to decolonise (see Mkandawire, 1999; 2011). 
But their efforts were not sustained long enough to see the project to its logical 
conclusion. This is partly because the project of declonisation was narrowly 
framed within the nationalist project by equating  decolonisation with political 
liberation (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012); focusing mainly on the physical 
withdraw of colonial regimes and the centralisation of power there after 
(Mkandawire, 1999). In other words, decolonisaion has been restricted to 
merely seeking the “political kingdom.” But a complete decolonial project 
has to go beyond the imperatives of political independence to include 
economic, cultural, and epistemological sovereignty, for the simple reason that 
the colonial project was not merely a political project, it was much more that. 
A narrow conception of colonialism tend to equate it with the physical presence 
of a colonising force, such that once the colonial powers withdraw, colonialism 
should not be an issue, since there are no more colonisers on African soil. But 
the colonial hegemony and rationality is very much alive today in all parts of 
Africa in the education sector, in the economy, in the way knowledge is produced 
and validated, and indeed in the dominant modes of thinking and the sets of 
aspirations. In political economy literature, this unrelenting colonial hegemony 
is widely referred to as neo-colonialism.
Because of the narrow conceptualisation of the decolinial project, it has been 
difficult to extend the reconstruction of the African thought and society beyond 
the political expediencies of the day, and as such, there are many aspects of 
African societies that still operate under the colonial grip, which has largely 
been invisible. But now it is gradually becoming apparent that colonialism 
was a much more complex phenomenon with far deeper effects on African 
societies  beyond the physical presence of the coloniser on African soil. 
Thus, colonialism, in different ways, is very much alive today even in the 
absence of a physical coloniser on the continent. Consequently, a total 
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decolonisation of the continent would require much more than simply dislodging 
colonial regimes from the continent; it requires a radical reorientation of the 
African worldview to something fundamentally African, which ultimately entails 
decolonising the African mind (see Ngugi, 1986), and modes of knowing and 
being. Tuck & Yang (2012) refers to this as a process of “decentering” colonialism.
DECOLONISATION AND COLONIALITY
The concept of decolonisation is increasingly becoming popular in academic 
circles in Africa, particularly, in the last half decade or so, to the extent of 
becoming a cliché. But there is much more to the concept of decolonisation 
than what is often conveyed in popular debates. Despite the lack of clarity on 
the exact meaning and practical implications of this concept, there is undoubtedly 
a revival of the radicalism of the 1960s; perhaps, representing a going back 
to the roots of sorts, may be an African renaissance of the 21st century. 
Prior to the current revival of media and scholarly interest in the decolonial 
discourse, the term decolonisation was used only by a few scholars in the 
global South, mainly the Latin America and Asian Subaltern Studies Group 
of scholars (see Grosfoguel, 2007). In South Africa, the term has been lifted 
into the national consciousness largely by the student movements: “#Rhodes 
Must Fall” and later, “#Fees Must Fall,” which have embarked on a specific 
campaign calling for the decolonisation of the higher education curriculum 
in South Africa (see Nyamnjoh, 2016).(1) For many scholars, the two big 
questions which arise when discussing decolonisation are: What does decolonisation 
mean? What does it entail in practical terms?
It is important, from the start, to note that, up to this point, the term 
decolonisation has not been sharply articulated, and as such no single definition 
exists. Several definitions have been offered and in some discussions, no attempts 
is made to define what is meant by decolonisation; there seem to be an assumption 
that the term is self-explanatory. But a cursory glance at the declonisation debates, 
reveals that the term can mean different things to different people. Depending 
on what meaning one adopts, decolonisation evokes a wide range of sentiments 
in different people. For instance, Suren Pillay (2013) reports that some esteemed 
professors have dismissed the term as “a dangerous call to participate in ‘applied 
nationalism.’” For such scholars, decolonial discourse evokes anxiety about the 
changes that such a project may bring. Understandably, genuine decolonisation 
involves a radical re-orientation of entire epistemologies and systems of power 
which can lead to anxiety and resentment for those who fail to see the violence 
of colonialism. A good example of this is Bruce Gilley’s (2017) article in which 
he argues that colonialism was not only a legitimate project, but hugely beneficial 
to the colonised peoples.
For some scholars, decolonisation is conceived as a critique of modernism, 
while for others it denotes a “critique of eurocentrism from subalternized and 
silenced knowledges” (see Grosfoguel, 2007). For Fanon (1963) decolonisation 
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is not just a critique, but a process and programme of de-centering (disordering) 
colonial rationality, structures, institutions, knowledge systems and world view. 
In the Fanonian framework, decolonization is a process of recovering oneself 
from the derangement which colonialism induced in the colonized; a recovery 
that unveils the myth that colonialism came to lighten the burden of the colonized. 
In that sense, we see Fanon in Wiredu (1998), who defines decolonization 
as simply a call for the colonized to know themselves better—as in the 
maxim, “African, know thyself.”
For Tuck & Yang (2012) decolonization is a project of ‘decentering settler 
perspectives’ and dominant theories of social change, which are presented as 
the only way to explain the world everywhere. While Tuck & Yang (2012) 
acknowledge the importance of decolonization, they are critical of the now 
popular calls for decolonization which, according to them, fail to grasp the deep 
implications of decolonization as a project that seeks to “decenter settler 
perspectives,” leading to perceptions of “decolonization as a metaphor” (Tuck 
& Yang, 2012). Decolonisation is sometimes conceptualized as something 
comparable to de-westernisation, meaning that “the rules of the game” are no 
longer set by “Western players and institutions.” If decolonization is seen from 
that angle, it inevitably leads to a “definitive rejection of ‘being told’ from the 
epistemic privileges of the zero point what we [the colonized] are, what our 
ranking is in relation to the ideal of humanitas and what we have to do to be 
recognized as such” (Mignolo, 2009: 3, emphasis in original).
When applied to the African context, the plurality of views on what 
decolonisation means is apparent. For instance, while Thomas Sankara 
conceptualised decolonisation as a revolutionary movement that sets the 
restoration of the dignity of African people as its goal (Sankara, 2005), Sabelo 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012) sees decolonization as primarily an epistemological 
undertaking that seeks to systematically “unpack” not only the genealogy of 
colonialism; but its ethical and ideological dimensions and assumptions. Similar 
to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012), Nyamnjoh (2012: 129) sees decolonization as a 
process of unveiling the hegemonic nature of the “epistemological paradigm of 
the conqueror.” For Ngugi Wa Thiongo (1986) decolonization in an African 
context essentially entails a process of overcoming the alienation of an African 
from her/his-self, caused by the colonial devaluation of African culture, life, art, 
religion, geography, education, literature, and most importantly, languages.
There are several other ways in which decolonization has been defined and 
approached, and it is not my intention here to exhaust the list of such definitions. 
My main aim in discussing the different meanings assigned to the term is to 
highlight the point that there are different views on what decolonization means, 
and that the meaning is contested. However, while decolonization is viewed 
from different perspectives by different scholars, as shown above, most of these 
views point to two fundamental aspects. The first is that colonialism was built 
on the assumption that there was only one valid way of knowing, one authentic 
way of being; one valid history, language, system of education, culture, etc; 
and that authentic way, was (and still is) that of the colonizing powers’. Whether 
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we take decolonization as decentering settler perspectives or overcoming the 
alienation of the colonized, the underlying point which these views bring out 
is that the colonizing powers devalued and dishonored other ways of knowing 
and being; other histories, other lives, cultures, languages, religions, etc. What 
this essentially means is that colonialism was a project infused with ontological, 
and as a consequence, epistemological violence. The physical violence, which 
is frequently associated with colonialism such as land dispossession, slavery, 
forced labour, unequal exchange of material goods and ideas, is underpinned by 
the ontological and the epistemological brutality it embodies. Thus, a decolonial 
project, by virtue of being a counter discourse, seeks to expose the violence by 
showing the disregard of other forms of knowing and being that colonial 
epistemologies constitute. In this sense, decolonization is a radical discourse that 
has the enlightenment of both the colonized as well as the colonizer as its 
objective (Mignolo, 2009).
The second fundamental feature that the different views on decolonisations 
discussed above bring out, albeit implicitly in some, is that colonialism is 
ultimately about power relations. It is the seemingly powerful (coloniser) 
who imposes his or her cosmology, epistemology, culture, language, and 
being, as ‘the’ world view, ‘the’ culture, ‘the’ knowledge, etc. This hegemonic 
posturing by the colonizer has evolved into what has been called the 
coloniality of power after the end of formal colinisation. Coloniality of power 
signifies the “Eurocentrification of the new world power” leading to “a new 
social classification of the world population on a global scale” (Quijano, 
2007: 171). This power matrix, on the side of the colonizer, was not only 
constructed through the barrel and gun powder, but through a systematic narrative 
that entrenches ontological and epistemological violence. Although often 
overlooked in the popular discussions of colonialism, the latter form of violence 
is much more harmful than the barrel and gun powder, and gives more power 
to the aggressor, in that it enables the colonizing powers to control how the 
colonized think, not just about the world, but also about themselves. As Lukes 
(1974) argues, the most powerful way of exercising power is by controlling 
people’s perceptions, system of values, wants, aspirations, views, beliefs, shared 
meaning and choices. It is this form of exercising power which is more subtle 
and often deeply entrenched in processes that apparently seem to be done in 
the interest of the powerless.
Colonisation was justified on exactly such grounds as evident in the civilising 
mission (Pax Britanica, and now Pax Americana) narrative; and Christianisation 
(saving the infidels/pagans from going to hell), as a favour to the colonised. 
Such sentiments are not buried with the end of colonial occupation, they are 
still being entertained, for example, in a recent article that argues for the 
replication of colonialism through the good governance agenda and the 
recolonization of weak states in the former colonised world (see Gilley, 2017). 
Through such views the colonisers continues to amass power in subtle ways 
that enables them to continue influencing what the colonised want, think and 
aspire for—holding the coloniser as the ideal, the ultimate example of a perfect 
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humanity, civilisation, culture, development, economy, education, system of land 
tenure, etc. This has been the most enduring dimension of colonialism which 
still has a lot of sway in the minds, actions and dreams of the colonised even 
after physical occupation of colonies ended.  Thus, decolonisation at this level 
requires much more thinking in order to unmask the subtle power which enables 
the colonialists to continue controlling the colonised’s minds and actions.
Understanding these two core elements of colonialism (the ontological and 
epistemological violence, and the power to control what the colonised want) is 
very central to understanding the decolonisation project, and the different forms 
in which coloniality(2) survives today (Maldonado-Torres, 2007). Seen from this 
perspective, decolonisation is not about reversing what colonialism has done so 
far; that would be not only an impossible, but also an unnecessary mission. A 
reversal of colonialism would imply going back to the static moment of encounter 
with the coloniser (see Nyamnjoh, 2012). For instance, decolonising the land 
tenure system in Africa does not mean that we go back to where African land 
tenure systems were before the colonial/imperial encounter; that would validate 
a static view of Africa, which in the end reinforces the colonial narrative.
However, this does not mean that decolonisation is an impossible undertaking; 
it means that a decolonial project undertakes to understand and expose the 
distortions, the violence and the power imbalances at play, and to find ways to 
re-orient the thinking, aspirations, perceptions, knowledges and the being of the 
colonised. It entails the unmasking and overcoming of the “widespread and 
stubborn misrepresentation of African cultures as static, bounded and primitive, 
and Africa as needing the benevolence and enlightenment of colonialism and 
Cartesian rationalism or their residue to come alive” (Nyamnjoh, 2012: 136). It 
involves, for example, unmasking the violence and power play entrenched in 
privileging statutory tenure over customary tenure; it requires rejecting the 
privileging of colonial epistemologies over endogenous systems of knowledge 
(Nabudere, 2006; Maldonado-Torres, 2007). Mkandawire (1997) frames this as 
the “demand to be heard” in a world where knowledge about Africa has not 
been produced to improve the welfare of Africans, but to better control them.
From this perspective, decolonisation is a call to a critical awareness of the 
fact that knowing is influenced by the location of both the known and the knower. 
Once this awareness is realised, it is inevitable that the locus of decolonisation 
should be on the ‘terms of the conversation,’ and not just the ‘content’ (Mignolo, 
2009). Paying attention to the location of the knower brings out what Mignolo 
(2009: 4) has referred to as the ‘geo-politics of knowledge,’  which makes clear 
the main task of decolonial thinking as the “unveiling of the epistemic silences 
of western epistemology and affirming the epistemic rights of the racially 
devalued.”
When the colonised are at this level of engagement, instead of prematurely 
celebrating the withdraw of the colonial regimes from colonised territories as 
the real moment of decolonisation, the focus shifts to the surviving influence 
of the coloniality of power that shapes not only the power relations, but also 
the way the colonised think, the way knowledge is produced, and what is 
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validated as “the” knowledge. This is a more radical way of breaking ranks 
with colonial hegemony and rationality. A decolonial thinking therefore embraces 
a broader view of colonialism beyond the physical imposition of a foreign rule, 
to include the reality of ontological and epistemological violence which entrenches 
a deeper form of control among the conlonised. It embraces the broader vision 
which creates room for a diversity of epistemologies and cultures beyond the 
western paradigms (Grosfoguel, 2007; Nyamnjoh, 2012).
THE POSTCOLONIAL AFRICAN STATES AND THE DECOLONIAL 
PROJECT
A close look at decolonisation from the ontological and epistemological point 
of view violence makes it clear that the post-colonial African states are sitting 
on an incomplete project. One does not have to go far to realise that the 
decolonial project in Africa so far has been restricted to the physical withdraw 
of the colonialist. But as illustrated above, this is only one dimension of a genuine 
decolonial project, and perhaps the easiest to accomplish. Any celebration of this 
dimension of decolonisation as the end game of the liberation struggle, “obscures 
the continuing operations of coloniality of power and hides the myths of 
decolonisation and illusion of freedom in Africa” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 71). It 
is such narrow conceptualisation of the decolonial project that explains the 
incompleteness of the project on the African continent and in other colonised 
countries. Colonialism as elaborated above, was not just about the imposition 
of foreign rule; it also encompassed the denial of the humanity of the colonised 
by degrading them to primitive people needing civilisation, and humanisation. 
Linda Thuwai Smith, speaking from the experience of the indigenous people of 
New Zealand, captures the degrading effects of colonialism succinctly when she 
argues that:
One of the supposed characteristics of primitive peoples was that we could 
not use our minds or intellects. We could not invent things, we could not 
create institutions or history, we could not imagine, we could not produce 
anything of value, we did not know how to use land and other resources 
from the natural world, we did not practice the ‘arts’ of civilisation. By 
lacking such values, we disqualified ourselves, not just from civilisation but 
from humanity itself. In other words, we were not “fully human;” some of 
us were not even considered partially human. Ideas about what counted as 
human in association with the power to define people as human or not 
human were already encoded in the imperial discourses prior to the period 
of imperialism… (cited in Mignolo, 2009: 13–14).
From what Smith is saying, there is no doubt that colonialism is much deeper 
than just an act of physical occupation of foreign territories; it involves a complex 
process of inferiorising and dehumanising other people. Inferiorising others 
29Trails of Incomplete Decolonisation in Africa
created power for the colonisers to decide not only who is to be counted as 
human, but what is good for the colonised, whether they know something or 
not, and more importantly that their knowing was second-rate. This power 
configuration (see Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012), continues 
in a subtle way (often branded as neo-colonialism), to influence not only the 
production of knowledge in the colonised societies, but also the modes of thought 
and the manner in which knowledge is validated.
The implication of this is that although the withdrawal of colonial regimes 
from African soil was accomplished during the 1960s, that did not mark the 
end of colonial influence; it was the first step on the long road to complete 
decolonisation. In Africa, decolonial thinking of the nationalists has, so far, not 
gone beyond this first step, to deconstruct the power structures of coloniality 
which perpetuate subservient and dependent relations with Africans, not only in 
matters of trade, but also culture, art, language, education and more importantly, 
the way knowledge is produced and validated. While post-colonial African states 
have been content and bent on wrestling the political kingdom from the colonialist 
(Fanon, 1963), they have forgotten that the real power lies in the colonial designs 
that control not only the way the colonised think, but what they want and the 
agenda they set for the future. Seemingly, this part of the decolonial project 
was assumed to follow naturally after achieving political decolonisation. But 
today, it has become quite clear that without unveiling and challenging the 
ontological and epistemological violence and the power matrix of colonialism, 
political independence actually means very little (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). Moyo 
& Yeros (2011) frame this as the return of the national question in which nations 
begin to assert their autonomy, seeking to extricate themselves from the hegemonic 
structures of neo-colonnialism. In trying to undo the colonial structures of power 
and influence, the revival of the national question is a manifestation of the 
search for alternatives to colonialism, which is popularly being framed as 
decolonisation—the need to overturn the coloniality of power.
With the colonial matrix of power remaining intact, Africa still remains “a 
product of active operations of colonial matrices of power” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2015: 15). Without critically engaging the power matrix of colonialism, the 
biased ontological and epistemological dualism which puts the colonised in an 
inferior, less rational, less civilised, less developed, less objective, less human, 
less modern, under-developed, position, will continue.
In this way, the colonisers will continue to put themselves up as,
…the mirror of the future of all societies and cultures, as the advanced 
form of the history of the entire [human] species. What does not cease to 
surprise, however, is that Europe succeeded in imposing that ‘mirage’ upon 
the practical totality of the cultures that it colonised; and, much more, that 
this chimera is still so attractive to so many (Quijano, 2007: 176).
A complete project of decolonisation would not ignore the mirage and leave 
it masked as the universal truth, the only truth; it would lay bare its geo-political 
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positionality, and seek to broaden the epistemological scope that allows for a 
genuine interchange of experiences and knowledges. Such a decolonial project 
will not be content with achieving a “mere modicum of juridical freedom… which 
has been mistakenly conflated with achievement of popular freedom for the 
ex-colonised African peoples” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 72–73).
To be fair, the nationalist project in Africa, through which the decolonial 
project was articulated, showed some commitment to decolonisation, and 
succeeded in achieving political decolonisation. Mkandawire (1999) observes 
that the nationalists in Africa allocated themselves five key tasks: ‘complete 
decolonisation,’ economic and social development, nation-building, 
democratisation, and regional cooperation. Out of these five, “only the first 
one—decolonization—has been completed, now that South Africa has at last 
won its arduous battle for non-colonial status” (Mkandawire, 1999: 75). From 
this, it is apparent that decolonisation has been restricted to the dislodgement 
of foreign rule from African soil, and this is one of the reasons why it makes 
perfect sense for the nationalist to assume that the achievement of political 
independence implied that colonialism was history; there was nothing more to 
fight against. This narrow approach to decolonisation explains why the project 
has remained largely incomplete, if not, totally abandoned today.
However, even if one takes the nationalists on their own terms, it is apparent 
that the self-allocated tasks remain incomplete to a large extent. While issues 
of economic and social development have remained on the radar (often thrust 
on the agenda by the former colonial powers), it is not clear if nation-building, 
democratisation and regional cooperation are still projects under construction 
today (Mkandawire, 2011). Soon after independence, the nationalist ideology itself 
became problematic as the project was reduced to that of nation-building, and 
eventually state-building, focusing on narrowly defined goals aimed at concentrating 
power and control in a few big men. This has become a pre-occupation of most 
of Africa’s political elite. At the moment, there are no indications that African 
leaders are even thinking about decolonisation in the broader sense discussed 
above. It is students demands, particularly in South Africa, for a declolonised 
curriculum, which have inadvertently reminded them about the incompleteness 
of the decolonisation project on the continent. It is not surprising that 
decolonisation as a process of disrupting colonial rationality; the re-orientation 
of African societies to alternative modes of being, knowing and relating with 
the world, has remained an unfinished business in many respects. In this sense, 
even the notions of a nation-state as an autonomous social and political formation 
has been largely hollowed out as most African states continue to operate under 
the coloniality of power, which dictate in subtle ways, what institutions to 
establish and how to run them. That dream of establishing genuine African 
systems and institutions built on the African world view and values has largely 
faded away. It is the colonial value system in all sectors of life which has been 
prioritised, giving rise to a situation where the African systems and values are 
viewed as negative forces. To illustrate this, I use two examples from the land 
and the economy.
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DECOLONISATION AND THE LAND QUESTION IN AFRICA
Like many other aspects of African life, the colonial encounter drastically 
changed not only the relations around land, but the way Africans think about 
land. There are several ways in which the colonial encounter significantly altered 
land relations and tenure arrangements in Africa. One of the most fundamental 
changes is the introduction of an entirely foreign land tenure system, based on 
European conception of land, and property in general. The large body of literature 
on land and land tenure in Africa is almost unanimous on the view that the 
dominant conception and approaches to land tenure and management in Africa 
today are largely a product of colonial construction (Okoth-Ogendo, 1989; Bassett, 
1993; Agbosu, 2000; Akuffo, 2009). In the context of decolonial thinking, it is 
important to note that this change has always been portrayed as a positive 
change (for the better), since customary land tenure systems in Africa were seen 
as the ones responsible for blocking progress to more productive use of land 
(see Bassett, 1993; Peters, 2009). This is one area where the coloniality of power 
is quite evident.
The introduction of a completely foreign way of thinking about land has not 
just led to tenure dualism (customary and statutory tenure); it has also been a 
source of tension between the two systems, and this sometimes has given rise 
to conflict over land. Sam Moyo (2007; 2008) in is work, consistently wrote 
about this as a sign of an incomplete process of decolonnisation; a failure to 
address the colonial imprints on the land and agrarian question in Africa. Agbosu 
(2000: 13–14) captures the tension that ensues when the two systems exist side 
by side, leading to “an ideological struggle reflecting the ideas of the two 
deferring systems of production in which the dominant capitalist ideas held sway 
over the traditional. The most significant areas in which these conflicts become 
manifest can be found in the transfer of interests in land.” Since the introduction 
of the European tenure system in Africa by the colonial governments, customary 
land systems have had an uneasy co-existence with the European system. In 
this disquiet cohabitation, customary land tenure has always been seen, by both 
the colonial and post-colonial African policymakers, as something backward, 
inferior, unproductive, inefficient, insecure, old-fashioned, and a barrier to 
investment and economic growth (see Peters, 2009; Bassett, 1993).
This should not be surprising, in the context of the discussion above, that the 
colonial discourse has always operated on a binary logic that inferiorises the 
experiences of the colonised. Colonisation by its nature is a direct confirmation 
of this binarism, which justifies the imposition of a foreign world view on 
another, on the pretext that one is better, more effective, more civilised than the 
other. It is this logic that does violence to the being and the knowing of the 
other. In this logic, statutory tenure is seen as more superior, more secure, with 
great potential to promote investment, increase productivity and contribute 
positively to economic growth and development. Here we have an example of 
a colonial experience presented as the ideal to which the colonised should aspire. 
The entire system is built around a biased dualism in which anything indigenous 
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is seen as inferior, backward and inefficient (see Mamdani, 1996). With specific 
reference to land tenure, the “early colonial and missionary attitude toward what 
they saw as “communal” forms of landholding was deeply entrenched in 
longstanding cultural preconceptions that set individual,  private ownership as 
superior to communal or collective forms of tenure” (Peters, 2009: 1317). The 
continuation of these preconceptions in post-colonial Africa is a reflection of 
the reality of the coloniality of power  and the incompleteness of the decolonial 
project.
DISTORTED CONCEPTION OF LAND
To understand the coloniality of power around land relations in Africa, it is 
important to identify the drastic changes or distortions that colonialism introduced 
in the African land systems. The first and most important distortion was around 
the conception of land itself. From a European perspective, land was largely 
conceptualised as a property like any other properties (Agbosu, 2000). As a 
property, all land had to have an “owner,” with absolute ownership (property) 
rights, such that land tenure was conceived as a set of clearly delineated rights 
and claims that one holds in the land. On the other hand, in the traditional 
African tenure system land was never thought of as a property that someone 
can exclusively own.  As Akuffo (2009) explains, the concept of land in traditional 
African society was deeply embedded in the complex social relations which 
defined access to land and the exercise of power over land. In this regard, a 
clear distinction was made between the soil (solum) and the things that grow 
on it; “there was a clear separation in African thought and law between the 
solum and any manifestation, such as crops, trees and buildings which symbolises 
human interaction with it” (Okoth-Ogendo, 1989: 8).  This separation was not 
present in the Dutch-Roman conception of land where the solum was fused 
together “with water and air in a compact, recording the claims of individuals 
rather than social labour upon it” (Okoth-Ogendo, 1989).
What this difference in the conception of land highlights is that land in the 
two systems mean different things. While in the European system it was the 
norm for the individual to have exclusive rights to land, in the traditional African 
system, ownership of the soil was only a reserve of the collective; only the 
things attached to the soil could be owned individually. The collective (which 
is often referred to as communal’ownership) was understood broadly to include 
the past (ancestors), those living at the time, and those yet to come (future 
generation). This intergenerational conception of land in Africa, transcends the 
immediate imperatives of individual ownership of the solum, at any particular 
moment since the land was intricately connected to the past and the future, not 
just the present. This is why it was only the collective (community in the broader 
sense) that could own the land; no single individual, not even the chief had 
ownership rights to the solum (Okoth-Ogendo, 1989; Mamdani, 1996; Agbosu, 
2000). Thus, when the concept of ownership is transported from its European 
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context to the African context, it creates not only confusion, but tension and 
conflict as well:
the transposition of Western (Roman-Dutch/civil law and Anglo-American) 
property concepts and terminology in the analyses of African processes is 
a veritable source of confusion. The characterisation of property concepts 
and legal relationships using Western analogies and paradigms is perhaps 
understandable but has nevertheless, led to an unnecessary degree of 
confusion with wholly negative practical consequences such as destructive 
litigation over land titles and land alienation (Akuffo, 2009: 62).
Earlier on, Meek (1946) issued a warning on the dangers of applying the 
European terms to understand land relations in Africa:
[A] frequent source of error has been a presupposition that native 
conceptions of ownership must be basically the same as those of Europeans. 
English terms such as ‘rent,’ or ‘lease’ have been employed to denote 
practices which bear only a superficial resemblance to those denoted by 
these terms. The gift given to chiefs as administrators of land have been 
assumed to be ‘rent’, and the chiefs to be ‘landlords’ (Meek, 1946: 11).
Meek’s caution above is critically important in highlighting the violence that 
a colonial imposition of a European experience, meaning and knowledge does 
to the colonised. However, instead of looking at these as misunderstandings of 
the local context, the assumption that the terms should mean the same reflects 
the coloniality of power where the experience of the colonised must be 
monotonically mapped onto the experience of the coloniser, since the later 
represents the ideal, the real, the rational, the advanced, the standard against 
which everything else should be measured. Anything that does not fit unto the 
European norm is dismissed as primitive, traditional, uncivilised, and barbaric. 
When seen from this perspective, the violence of colonialism becomes more 
palpable, and the incompleteness of the decolonial project becomes conspicuously 
evident.
The implications of the conceptual distortion of land is that land then becomes 
a commodity which can be sold and bought like anything else. In an African 
setting, this creates numerous conceptual and practical challenges which led to 
three basic distortions: that land should have an owner; that only members of 
a given tribe should own land in a particular community, and that the person 
responsible for the administration of land is effectively the land owner (see 
Mamdani, 1996). By presenting the European system as superior to the African, 
the colonialists created an imbalanced power relation where their system becomes 
the sought after, and the traditional system is something that had to be abandoned. 
This has continued even today when statutory tenure is not only preferred, but 
is emphatically endorsed by many African governments, with the aim of replacing 
customary tenure.
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As illustrated later, most African political elite still believe that customary 
tenure has no place in modern Africa, and at various times, frantic efforts have 
been made to do away with customary tenure. Here again we have an example 
of how coloniality of power continues to shape not just the way the colonised 
think, but also what they aspire for. There is nothing more powerful than having 
the power to control what someone thinks and wants, as Lukes (1974) argues. 
By affirming the colonial claim that customary land represents backwardness 
and a barrier to progress, the colonised have forfeited power to the coloniser 
who then has an advantage because his or her ideas become dominant, become 
the leading ideas. This has resulted not only in the distortion of the African 
experience, but has also stifled the efforts to understand land relations in Africa 
after the colonial encounter, as Bassett (1993: 5) observes: “The tendency of 
colonial apologists to project their own (European models and concepts onto 
African societies has hindered our understanding of development and change in 
this area. …ethnocentric and ideological biases and their attendant political 
agenda distort much of the literature.”
COLONIAL DNA ON AFRICA’S LAND
Privileging colonial ideas is also evident in the structure and institutions 
surrounding land administration in Africa’s urban and rural areas. As Home 
(2012: 62) argues, the “legacy of colonialism is still etched on the landscape 
and practices of Sub-Saharan African Towns and cities.” Many post-colonial 
African governments, immediately after independence, formulated laws and 
policies to respond to the challenges of land tenure and agrarian reforms 
introduced by colonial regimes (Adams & Turner, 2005). But most of these 
laws and institutions simply inherited and tinkered with the colonial social 
engineering to the extent that continuity has been the norm rather than the 
exception (Bassett, 1993). Continuity in these reforms is evident in three 
aspects: the first is that “many post-colonial governments simply retained or 
revised colonial land rules.” The second is that many of the African governments 
have continued to perceive customary tenure as something that hinders 
development and therefore inferior; and thirdly, the colonial idea that by merely 
reforming land tenure arrangements, the complex agrarian transformation issues 
will be resolved, has continued to define the official approach to land reform 
in post-colonial Africa, where land tenure reform is broadly seen as a panacea 
for everything (Bassett, 1993: 9; Moyo, 2007). Apart from these three, there 
have been continuities in the land administration institutions with only cosmetic 
changes introduced (Adams, 2003). For example, the centralisation of land 
administration is something introduced by the colonial governments prior to the 
1960s, and yet in many countries these same structures have remained intact, 
with land administration concentrated in the capital cities, as was the case in 
colonial times.
This is a clear sign of the failure to deconstruct the colonial structure in the 
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post-colonial context. If we start from the view that colonial institutions and legal 
systems around land were introduced to serve colonial interests (often without any 
due regard to the colonised), it would be expected that the post-colonial African 
states, because of their opposition to the colonial project as a whole, would 
re-orient and radically transform these institutions and laws to serve the interest 
of the African people. But so far, little has happened in that regard (Metcalfe & 
Kepe, 2008). To achieve this, a radical re-orientation of the colonial system is 
needed. This is more so because of the centrality of land in the liberation 
struggle, but also in the lives of many Africans today. Despite land being the 
key motive for the liberation struggle across Africa (Havnevik, 1997), the land 
and agrarian questions remain aspects of post-colonial African societies where 
decolonisation is poignantly incomplete (Moyo, 2007).
As noted above, we have seen many African governments privileging statutory 
tenure over customary tenure in no uncertain terms. For instance the 2006 draft 
land policy in Zambia does not hide the fact that customary land tenure is not 
a suitable form of land tenure, in a manner that sounds like a rehearsal of the 
colonial narrative:
Free access to resources provided by customary tenure has the disadvantage 
that the individual has no incentive to invest in common resources such 
as pasture improvement. This has the effect of encouraging overuse and 
can result in severe degradation of the environment. Rights derived from 
customary tenure are not registered and difficult to define. Private credit 
institutions do not recognise such rights as collateral. Furthermore, rights 
to land derived from customary tenure are subject to local practices and 
beliefs (The Republic of Zambia, 2006: 13).
Similar views can be found in the national land policies in Tanzania, Ghana, 
Zimbabwe, South Africa, Swaziland, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, Malawi 
and Liberia, where the drive to formalise customary land through some form 
of statutory instrument has been promoted as a way to attract foreign investment 
in land. While in many countries this is not stated so clearly, it is evident that 
policy makers have fallen prey to the colonial chimera that everything non-European 
is retrogressive and not desirable; they have surrendered their power to think 
independently, thereby losing control to determine their thinking and system of 
wants.
The other example of the failure to decolonise the land tenure in African lies 
is the maintenance of the colonial land ownership structures, especially in the 
former settler colonies where large portions of land were alienated from local 
communities by European settlers. Sam Moyo (2007) identifies the failure to 
redistribute land after independence as one example of incomplete decolonisation. 
He frames the debate broadly around reparation for “colonial land loses” which 
many African governments have not addressed. A decolonial thinking around 
land would follow the logic that the mass dispossession of indigenous people 
during colonial rule merits a massive land redistribution to re-orient the colonially 
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designed land and agrarian structure.
As observed above, although many African countries gained independence 60 
years ago, restructuring colonial land tenure policy and institutions is one area 
where decolonisation has remarkably failed, with most governments maintaining the 
colonial land administrative policies and institutions (Adams, 2003; Obeng-Odoom, 
2012). As a result, the inability to expose the violence of colonialism and therefore 
the need to decolonise to create an environment where justice can be restored, 
is evident.  Instead,  just as the “colonial government found ruling the indigenous 
hinterland easier by co-opting traditional governance system, rather than 
deconstructing them… post-colonial, independent, African governments have 
more or less adopted the same approach” (Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008: 238).
Even in countries where some relatively radical reforms were undertaken by 
means of nationalising land and the abolishment of freehold title in Tanzania, 
Zambia, Ethiopia and Guinea, there has been widespread failure to reconstruct 
the colonial agrarian landscape. For instance, in Zambia, despite the seemingly 
radical steps introduced by the Kaunda government (to nationalise land in 1975 
by abolishing freehold tenure), land throughout the post-colonial period retained 
the original colonial tri-modal structure of crown land (which was simply renamed 
state land at independence), and native reserves and trust land. Native and Trust 
lands comprised lands that were reserved for the native populations and were 
therefore administered by traditional authorities using local customary norms 
and traditional practices. It was only in 1995 when native reserves and trust 
lands were consolidated into one category—customary land. This consolidation 
of the two categories into customary land was merely cosmetic and did not in 
any way alter people’s rights to customary land. Thus, even after the reforms 
introduced in 1995 in Zambia, land tenure dualism (customary and statutory) 
has persisted, with customary land tenure widely perceived as something 
retrogressive that needs to be done away with. As a result, customary tenure 
continues to awkwardly coexist with statutory tenure as evident in the practice 
of converting customary land into leasehold tenure which is promoted by the 
state (Chitonge et al., 2017). Land tenure dualism is so prevalent across Africa 
that it defines the continent’s agrarian land scape. It is here where the failure 
to grasp the ontological and epistemological violence and the power matrix 
inherent in the colonial design becomes more obvious. A genuine decolonial 
project should aim to reconstruct and re-orient the colonial land and agrarian 
structure.
DECOLONISATION AND THE AFRICAN ECONOMIES
The other example I would like to use to illustrate the incompleteness of the 
decolonial project is the structures of African economies. The economic sphere 
presents another interesting example of how the colonial logic continues to 
operate today, conceptually and theoretically, to shape the economic and 
development agenda. A quick glance at the structure of most African economies 
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today makes this very clear. Almost 60 years after colonial occupation ended, 
most African economies still have the same economic structure that was left by 
the colonialists; most of them are still predominantly extractive mono-economies. 
As Table 1 shows, most of the countries are involved in the extraction of raw 
materials as was the case during colonialism. In many countries, only a few 
commodities account for the entire export earning; meaning that the economies 
have drastically failed to diversify the production and export base (see Chitonge, 
2015).
In countries such as Angola, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Nigeria, only one 
commodity accounts for more than 75 percent of total exports (Table 1). Most 
importantly, even in countries with more than one major exports, these exports 
are predominantly raw materials, sent to Europe and other developed countries, 
unprocessed. In the colonial economic logic, defined by the international division 
of labour, the African economies were set up to dig out minerals from the 
ground and grow agricultural products to feed the industries in Europe and 
America. This set up puts African economies at a great disadvantage in that the 
activities to which they are assigned add low value, leading to the situation 
where these economies only capture a tiny fraction of the value chains in which 
they participate (Chitonge, 2015). Walter Rodney, in his famous book, How 
Europe Underdeveloped Africa, captures the colonial design well when he 
observes that in the colonial division of labour, “Africans were to dig minerals 
out of the subsoil, grow agricultural crops, collect natural products, and perform 
a number of other odds and ends such as bicycle repairing. Inside Europe, North 
America, and Japan, workers would refine the minerals and the raw materials 
and make the bicycles” (Rodney, 1974: 177).
The platinum that is mined in South Africa and Zimbabwe is exported “raw” to 
Germany (and now China) where it is processed into metal alloy which is used in 
the manufacturing of cars and other heavy metal equipment. South Africa and 
Zimbabwe only captures 15–25 percent of the platinum value chain. Of course 
this serves the colonialists interests well, and the expectation was that in post-
colonial Africa, all African economies will be re-oriented to serve the interest 
of the African people. Yet, most economies in Africa have maintained the same 
economic structure; resulting in serious economic leakage to the former colonial 
powers.
The broader context to this is that African economies were immersed into the 
colonial global economy in an extroverted manner, such that African economies 
would produce raw materials which were exported for processing in developed 
countries and brought back for the consumption of a small elite population 
which is now growing if we take the stories about the rise of Africa’s middle 
class seriously (see Melber, 2016).
Hountondji (1997) and Nabudere (2006) draw interesting parallels between 
the structures of commodity and knowledge production, arguing that in both 
cases, Africa is geared to produce raw materials for processing in Europe into 
finished products, which are then returned for the consumption of a few. The 
production of knowledge and commodities is structured in such as a way that 
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raw materials and raw data are extracted from Africa, processed elsewhere and 
exported back to Africa for consumption, but only for a few in both cases. The 
copper that is dug out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is 
processed in China just as the data collected in Mali or Kenya is processed in 
France and Britain respectively, and then the copper products and the findings 
(and theories constructed) are then exported back to Africa. This again exposes 
the violence of the colonial design and social engineering to the extent that it 
becomes a social justice issue. Here decolonisation is not just a critique but 
reveals the injustice  of the entire system.










Number of export 
products adding up 
to 75 of total export
Angola Petroleum 97.3 1
Botswana Diamonds Raw 43.7 Nickel Mattes 21.9 Diamond 8.9 4
Burundi Coffee unroasted 70.2 Black tea 13.1 2
Chad Petroleum 80.6 Petroleum oils 8.6 1
Cameroon Petroleum 42.1 Cocoa bean 15.8 Wood 7.2 6
Congo Petroleum 85.1 1
Ethiopia Coffee unroasted 42.1 Sesame Seed 22.5 Cotton Shirts 8.6 19
Gabon Petroleum 75.8 Manganese Oil 12.3 Cut flowers 10.7 3
Kenya Black tea 18.6 Cut flower 13.1 Coffee not roasted 6.1 48
Malawi Tobacco 53.0 Black tea 6.9 Uranium 6.5 5
Mali Cotton 35.6 Petroleum oils 29.1 Sesame Seed 7.8 4
Mauritius Tuna 11.3 Shirts 11.0 Cane beet 6.8 43
Namibia Uranium 26.8 Diamond 16.1 Zinc 13.4 6
Nigeria Petroleum 85.9 Natural Gas 6.9 1
Rwanda Coffee unroasted 30.4 Vanadium Ores 24.8 Black tea 13.8 4
Senegal Petroleum 26.4 Cement 10.5 Phosphoric acid 9.8 18
South Africa Platinum 7.6 Gold 6.9 92
Tanzania Precious metal 14.5 Tobacco 8.7 Coffee not roasted 6.4 24
Togo Cocoa Bean 26.7 Gold 12.8 Cement 10.1 8
Uganda Coffee unroasted 32.8 Tobacco 9.9 Fish fillet 9.3 13
Zambia Copper Cathodes 48.0 Copper anodes 26.7 Cobalt 11.2 3
Zimbabwe Tabacco 20.5 Chromium 15.3 Nickel 7.1 17
Source: Author based on data from African Development Indicators 2012/13 (World Bank, 2013).
Note: Countries are selected randomly. For a full list of countries, see World Bank (2013: 72–73). 
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The other way in which decolonisation has remained incomplete in the 
economic sector is around the enclave nature of African economies (Moyo, 2008). 
Enclavity is a concept that captures well the colonial logic where economic 
activities in Africa were set up without any regard for the local population; the 
driving motive was to serve particular colonial interests (Mhone, 2001). It is 
common to find, even today, that a mine develops in an area where a lot of 
people are not connected to the activities of a mine in any significant way (and 
were they are, it is through the negative impact of the mine such as water 
pollution and land degradation). During colonial times, such activities did not 
take into account the plight of the people around the mine; the interest was 
only to dig the minerals out of the soil. As a result, pockets of modern 
infrastructure and economic activities developed in the sea of poverty and 
misery—hence the enclave nature of these activities. Kamarck (1967) gives an 
example of roads or railway lines which were constructed by the colonial 
governments in Africa as an example. He argues that these were meant specifically 
to transport the minerals form the mine to the point of export, with no due 
regard given to the local people living along the road or railway line. Most of 
these projects have continued today, characterised by new forms of enclavity, 
mimicking the colonial design. A decolonised economy is expected to re-orient 
the logic of these projects in ways that recognise and value the humanity of 
the people around. But because the dominant logic operative even today is still 
entrenched in the colonial matrix of power, the process of decolonisation has 
not translated into anything tangible in this respect. Enclavity is still a dominant 
characteristic that defines most African economies in one way or another, to 
such an extent that in some cases we have continued to use the same roads 
that were constructed during colonial rule.
The other area where decolonisation has not gone far is around the use of 
economic growth models. It is common within the economic mainstream 
scholarship to employ economic models developed in the advanced economies 
and expect these to explain and shed more light on the challenges of economic 
growth in Africa and other developing areas (see Chitonge, 2015). The problem 
with importing economic models was observed earlier by the pioneers of 
development economics such as Albert Hirschman who argued that these models 
developed to understand economic problems in advanced economies have little 
relevance in developing countries. Hirschman (1958) in particular argued that 
these models because they were constructed to understand economic challenges 
in advanced economies, they “will have minimum relevance in any radically 
different environment.” He goes further to advise that the “economics of 
development [developing economies] dare to borrow too extensively from the 
economics of growth [advanced economies], like the underdeveloped countries 
themselves, it must learn to walk on its own feet, which means that it must 
work out its own abstractions” (Hirschman, 1958: 33). But in the colonial 
framework, valid knowledge is only that which is produced in the coloniser; 
the rest of the world produce wisdom and culture (Mignolo, 2009); and as such 
they rest of the world should rely on theories and models from the dominant 
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economies. Use of such models in Africa and other colonised places only reflect 
the failure to decolonise the knowledge production system which continues to 
operate on a biased and violent epistemic structure.
CONCLUSION
There are other ways in which decolonisation can be demonstrated to be 
incomplete in Africa. In this paper, I have focused on the land and the economy 
as examples and the discussion above has presented a number of ways in which 
the colonial logic and design continues to influence the thought and practice in 
colonised areas. From the discussion above, it is apparent that genuine 
decolonisation is not a simple project, it requires developing a critical decolonial 
thinking that unmasks the violence and lop-sidedness of colonialism. The first 
step to a decolonial thinking is a full understanding of the coloniality of power 
and what this entails for a process of decolonisation. A failure to grasp the deep 
rootedness of colonialism and its power can lead to premature celebration of 
an incomplete decolonisation as was the case in Africa where the dislodgment 
of colonial regimes from the continent  was celebrated as if it as the ultimate 
goal.
It is also clear that a decolonial project does not entail reversing colonialis, 
but rather unveiling its violence, injustice and insensitivity and then re-orienting 
the societies of the colonised. This, as noted earlier is not a mean task; it calls 
for a radical engagement and commitment to changing the power matrix between 
the colonised and the coloniser.
This paper has shown that although colonial occupation ended during the 
1960s in most countries, the effects of colonialism are still very much alive 
today and manifest in different forms. In the case of land, the tenure dualism, 
with an outright preference of the statutory tenure system over customary tenure 
demonstrate the coloniality of power where the colonised is made to believe 
the coloniser’s knowledge, systems of law, education, cultures, languages is more 
superior and therefore desirable. In the economic sphere, the failure to transform 
the extroverted structure of African economies, set up during colonialism, into 
diversified production and export bases also highlight the incomplete nature of 
the decolonisation project. The repeated calls from students to transform the 
curriculum in African universities is an indication that there is need to engage 
with the colonial realities in Africa, not just around education, but in other 
aspects of life including the economy.
NOTES
(1) It is not clear if similar calls have been made in institutions of higher learning in other 
countries. But the sentiments of having an Africa-centred knowledge system are strong 
across the continent not just today (see Nabudere, 2006).
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(2) Maldonado-Torres (2007: 243) distinguishes colonialism as a political and economic 
relations between the colonised and the colonised, while coloniality refers to the 
“long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that 
define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well 
beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations.”
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